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Highly knowledgeable people often fail to achieve highly accurate judgments, a phenomenon sometimes called the ‘‘process-
performance paradox.’’ The present research tested for this paradox in foreign exchange (FX) rate forecasting. Forty professional
and 57 sophisticated amateur forecasters made one-day and one-week-ahead FX predictions in deterministic and probabilistic
formats. Among the conclusions indicated by the results are: (a) professional accuracy usually surpasses amateur accuracy, although
many amateurs outperform many professionals; (b) professionals appear to achieve high proﬁciency via heavy reliance on predictive
information (unlike what has been observed before, e.g., for stock prices); (c) forecast format strongly aﬀects judgment accuracy and
processes; and (d) apparent overconﬁdence can transform itself into underconﬁdence depending on when and how forecasters must
articulate their conﬁdence.
 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Almost every practical decision, by individuals or
organizations, rests at least partly on judgments con-
cerning particular facts or occurrences. Picture a medi-
cal patient and her physician deciding whether to treat
her illness by surgery rather than drugs. That choice
undoubtedly is driven to some degree by their beliefs
about the relative chances that the alternative treat-
ments will relieve her condition, that those treatments
will cause various side eﬀects, and that she will react
badly to those eﬀects. Or imagine a companys board of
directors deliberating a radical shift in the companys
strategic direction. Quite plausibly, a key reason for
even considering such a move is managements belief
that markets for the companys core products are about
to change markedly. How well decisions turn out de-
pends on a host of considerations. But central to the
eventual adequacy of those decisions is the accuracy of
the judgments on which they are predicated. That is,
judgment accuracy imposes a ceiling on decision quality.qHelpful comments on earlier versions of this article by Terry
Connolly and two anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged.
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doi:10.1016/S0749-5978(03)00058-XThus, if their judgments about surgery outcomes tend to
be highly inaccurate, then patients and physicians will
often ﬁnd themselves electing surgeries that leave the
patients worse oﬀ than they would have been with
drug treatments, and vice versa. Similarly, corporate
boards whose strategic decisions repeatedly are groun-
ded in erroneous predictions about future market trends
cannot help driving their companies into insolvency. It is
therefore essential that deciders—individuals and orga-
nizations—do whatever they can to assure that the
judgments informing their decisions are as accurate as is
possible and feasible.
When confronted with a signiﬁcant decision problem,
deciders could rely solely on their own judgments. Al-
ternatively, they could consult with others, including
professionals who, in eﬀect, sell their assessments for a
price. Thus, a patient and her physician might solicit the
prognoses of a recognized authority on a treatment
under consideration. Or a board of directors might
commission a respected expert to draw on her knowl-
edge and skills to render an informed opinion about
how the markets for the companys products are likely
to develop in the years ahead. This prospect of profes-
sional consultation brings to the fore several important
practical and scientiﬁc questions.reserved.
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should deciders anticipate that professionals judgments
would be? Should they expect the accuracy of those
judgments to be so much better than the accuracy of
their own ‘‘amateur’’ judgments as to justify their ex-
pense? Or would the deciders be better oﬀ simply relying
on their personal assessments? It is hard to imagine that,
in virtually any domain, professional judgment would
not generally be signiﬁcantly superior to that of ama-
teurs. After all, it seems reasonable to expect that pro-
fessionals with deﬁcient skills would be driven from the
marketplace. Contrary to this sensible expectation,
however, there have been numerous demonstrations of
what is sometimes called a ‘‘process-performance para-
dox’’ (Camerer & Johnson, 1997), whereby individuals
with vast knowledge about a domain nevertheless are
unable to render highly accurate predictions in that
arena (e.g., Enis, 1995; Spence & Brucks, 1997). So the
answer to the ‘‘expectations question’’ is not a given.
Now, suppose that deciders do choose to solicit
professional judgments to help guide their decisions.
There are numerous formats in which they might re-
quest that the professionals deliver their opinions. An
especially important format distinction is that between
categorical or deterministic judgments, on the one hand,
and probabilistic judgments, on the other. For instance,
a consulting specialist might be asked for his ‘‘best
guess’’ as to whether, in a case under consideration, a
surgical procedure would succeed or fail. Alternatively,
the consultant might be asked to indicate what is, in his
view, the 0–100% probability that the operation would
be a success. There are conceptual as well as practical
reasons to favor probabilistic over categorical formats.
Perhaps the most compelling is that judgments in
probabilistic form allow deciders to trade oﬀ the actual
uncertainty that always exists—whether acknowledged
or not—against the signiﬁcance or value of potential
outcomes, as in expected utility operators (cf., Yates,
Price, Lee, & Ramirez, 1996). Nevertheless, other con-
siderations, including peoples greater familiarity with
them, might argue for deterministic judgments as the
answer to the ‘‘format question’’ in a given decision
situation.
Let us say that, for a particular domain, there are
reliable diﬀerences in the accuracy of judgments oﬀered
by professionals and amateurs. It is then essential to
achieve both contemporaneous and developmental ex-
planations for those diﬀerences. A ‘‘contemporaneous
explanation’’ would identify the alternative routes by
which the professionals and amateurs arrive at their
assessments in the here and now. That is, it would iso-
late and document speciﬁc diﬀerences in professionals
and amateurs judgment processes that contribute to
their accuracy diﬀerences. A ‘‘developmental explana-
tion’’ would go a step further. It would shed light on
why those process diﬀerences came to exist, e.g., par-ticular training and work experiences. Implicit in both
levels of explanation would be prescriptions for how
managers could more readily identify or accelerate the
development of true judgment expertise.
The research described in the present article sought
answers to the above expectations, format, and expla-
nation questions about professional judgment in a do-
main that has considerable signiﬁcance in its own right,
the domain of foreign exchange (FX) rates. Virtually
every sizable organization today, from commercial en-
terprises to non-proﬁt professional associations, must
contend with rapid and relentless globalization, whether
they like it or not. International currency diﬀerences are
a key element of the globalization challenge. A shift in
FX rates can mean that essential company supplies that
were easily aﬀorded last week are suddenly crushingly
expensive. Or it could mean the opposite, that whereas
the companys products were priced out of certain
markets yesterday, they are competitive in those locales
today. The challenge is felt at the personal level, too.
Every consumer (or worker) is aware from newscasts
that, because of FX rate shifts (‘‘The dollar fell sharply
today. . .’’), the prices of the goods she must buy (or her
company might sell abroad) can change suddenly, with
immediate and often dramatic impact. Her paycheck
eﬀectively grows or shrinks in a ﬂash (to nothing if her
company fails). Obviously, organizations and individu-
als should seek to make decisions that protect and
promote their interests in the face of potential FX rate
changes. And clearly, the ability to accurately anticipate
those changes allows for superior choices.
The importance of FX rates, as well as accurately
predicting them, is even greater in some countries than
others. Such rates assume special signiﬁcance in econo-
mies undergoing rapid and volatile change. For in those
circumstances, the value of the local currency relative to
foreign currencies is likely to be highly changeable, too.
This means that FX-related decisions made by organi-
zations and consumers in such environments are par-
ticularly critical. And, therefore, so is the importance of
accurate FX rate predictions. The empirical work re-
ported in this article was conducted in Turkey, during a
time when the Turkish economy had the characteristics
described here. Circumstances were even more interest-
ing because Turkish law permitted the free use of foreign
currencies in everyday consumer transactions ‘‘on the
street.’’ Thus, it would not be unusual for an ordinary
Turkish citizen to collect his pay in the local currency
and then go to a currency exchange to convert it to the
foreign currency he expected to fare best in the FX
market in the future.
The conditions in Turkey thus provided an unusually
rich opportunity to address the expectations, format,
and explanation questions sketched above, where they
really mattered. Speciﬁcally, these were the questions
pursued:
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sionals to make FX rate predictions that are signiﬁ-
cantly more accurate than their own, such that it would
make sense for them to contract for the services of those
professionals? Put another way, is it reasonable to ex-
pect professional FX forecasters in situations like that in
Turkey to display the high degree of accuracy charac-
teristic of, say, weather forecasters (e.g., Murphy &
Brown, 1984)? That accuracy is often attributed to the
fact that, besides having access to good models, weather
forecasters make many, many judgments and they get
immediate feedback about every one of them. Profes-
sional FX forecasters in Turkey make lots of judgments,
too, although not as many as weather forecasters. They
also have immediate feedback, even though it is
doubtful that most of them analyze that feedback as
carefully and systematically as weather forecasters do.
On the other hand, there is little evidence that even ex-
perienced professionals can make highly accurate pre-
dictions of stock prices and earnings (cf., Sta€el von
Holstein, 1972; Yates, McDaniel, & Brown, 1991). One
proposed explanation for this modest level of accuracy,
for stock prices, at least, is that the markets for such
securities are eﬃcient. This implies that, unless he is an
insider in every company—which is, of course, impossi-
ble—even the most proﬁcient professional cannot ac-
quire facts that are inherently capable of supporting
great accuracy over an extended time period. Similar
arguments in FX markets have motivated claims that
FX rates follow random walks, implying that it would
be quite diﬃcult for anybody to make rate predictions at
above-chance accuracy levels (e.g., Mussa, 1979). But
ﬁndings contradicting the random-walk view have also
been reported (e.g., Lai & Pauly, 1992), along with
various models predicting forecasting performance
consistent with those reports (e.g., Sarantis & Stewart,
1995). Thus, a priori, it is by no means obvious what
accuracy expectations ought to be.
Format. If one were to acquire FX rate predictions
from professionals in the Turkish type of situation, would
it matter how those judgments were rendered? As noted
before, in principle, probabilistic judgments are pref-
erable if for no other reason than that they would allow
deciders to trade oﬀ uncertainty against other consider-
ations. But when those professionals express their un-
certainty probabilistically, is this truly informative? Or, in
eﬀect, do demands for probabilistic expression (and
maybe other modes) simply add useless fuzziness to their
deterministic judgments, perhaps because forecasters are
unaccustomed to or fundamentally incapable of skillfully
articulating their opinions that way?
Explanation. Suppose that professional and amateur
FX rate judgments in the Turkish kind of context diﬀer
in accuracy. Why might that be so? At the level of
contemporaneous explanations, the diﬀerences might
ﬁnd their origins in the judgment process variationsimplicated by decompositions of judgment accuracy that
have received attention in recent years (e.g., Yaniv &
Foster, 1995; Yates, 1994, 1998). By their nature, as
snapshots of current processes, such analyses cannot
deﬁnitively establish how process variations developed.
But they can narrow the possibilities signiﬁcantly.Method
Participants
Forty FX dealers and business professionals respon-
sible for FX forecasts for their companies served as the
professionals in the study. The amateurs were 57 busi-
ness students at Bilkent University in Ankara. Thus, the
amateurs were not at all na€ıve. They generally had for-
mal training in ﬁnance and forecasting and were all
accustomed to the kind of personal, ‘‘street-level’’ cur-
rency trading common in Turkey at the time. The pro-
fessionals were recruited through personal contact, the
students via announcements in classes. All participants
volunteered their services; they received no ﬁnancial
compensation.
Forecasting tasks
Each participant made forecasts for 10 exchange
rates. There were ﬁve major ‘‘cross rates’’: US dollar/
Deutschemark, British pound/US dollar, US dollar/
Swiss franc, US dollar/Japanese yen, and Deut-
schemark/Japanese yen. And there were ﬁve ‘‘do-
mestic-currency-based rates’’: US dollar/Turkish lira,
Deutschemark/Turkish lira, British pound/Turkish
lira, Swiss franc/Turkish lira, and Japanese yen/Turkish
lira. Every participant made six sets of 50 forecasts for
these rates, implying six basic tasks distinguished by
formats and horizons:
• Point forecasts (Tasks 1 & 2): one-day horizon (dai-
ly), one-week horizon (weekly).
• Directional forecasts (Tasks 3 & 4): one-day horizon
(daily), one-week horizon (weekly).
• Interval forecasts (Tasks 5 & 6): one-day horizon
(daily), one-week horizon (weekly).
The term ‘‘horizon’’ refers to the time between when
the forecaster made a prediction and the future date to
which that prediction referred:
One-day horizon. For a daily or one-day-ahead pre-
diction, the participants aim was to anticipate the
Reuters 11 a.m. TLFX-FY rate for the following day,
the standard in the FX ﬁnancial community. As back-
ground information, for a given currency, every partic-
ipant was provided with the daily rate values for the
previous four months (78 trading days in total) in
graphical form, and also the most recent 10 values, in
tabular form. For each of the 10 rates, each participant
Table 1
Medians [ranges] of median absolute percentage error (MdAPE) values
for point forecasts by professional and amateur forecasters, for one-
day and one-week horizons
Horizon Forecaster group
Professionals Amateurs
One day .30%a ;b .40%a
[.20%, .60%] [.20%, .60%]
One week .90%b 1.00%
[.30%, 1.90%] [.50%, 1.60%]
Note. Smaller values of MdAPE better.
aOne-day horizon better than one-week horizon per Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test.
b Professionals better than amateurs per Mann–Whitney U test.
** p < :01.
*** p < :001.
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for a total of 50 daily forecasts.
One-week horizon. For a weekly or one-week-ahead
forecast, the participant sought to predict the Reuters
11 a.m. TLFX-FY rate for Monday one week hence, the
opening rate for the week. As background, for each cur-
rency, the participant was provided with the weekly
Monday-opening values for the previous 18 months (78
Monday openings in total), again in graphical form, as
well as the last 10 values in a table. For each of the 10 rates,
each participant made one-week-ahead forecasts for ﬁve
consecutive weeks, for a total of 50 weekly forecasts.
Essential requirements of the alternative prediction
formats were as follows:
Point forecasts: Provide a single-value prediction for
the rate in question.
Directional forecasts: First indicate whether the focal
rate will either (a) increase or (b) decrease or remain the
same. Then state a 50–100% probability judgment that
the indicated directional prediction will indeed prove to
be correct.
Interval forecasts: Specify an interval for the focal
rate such that there is a 90% probability that the true
value of that rate will in fact be captured by that in-
terval, i.e., a 90% credible interval (cf., Yates, 1990,
pp. 21–23).
Appendix A presents the speciﬁc instructions given to
participants. It also shows an illustration of the form
participants used to render their judgments.
Personal performance expectations
After receiving instructions but before reporting
judgments, each participant was asked to state personal
performance expectations as follows:
Point forecasts: ‘‘You will be making 50 (daily/
weekly) point forecasts in total. In how many cases (out
of 50) do you expect the realized value to be exactly
equal to your point forecast?’’
Directional forecasts: ‘‘You will be making 50 (daily/
weekly) directional forecasts in total. In how many cases
(out of 50) do you expect the realized change to fall in
the direction you predicted?’’
Interval forecasts: ‘‘You will be making 50 (daily/
weekly) interval forecasts in total. In how many cases
(out of 50) do you expect the realized value to fall within
your prediction interval?’’
Procedure
At the beginning of the ﬁrst session, participants were
given detailed information about the study. Forecast
elicitation formats were explained and examples were
given. Participants were informed that various perfor-
mance scores would be computed for their individual
forecasts. They were also told that no information abouttheir predictive accuracy would be disclosed to other
participants (or, in the case of the professionals, to their
managers or co-workers). After that, participants re-
ported their initial sets of forecasts. They did the same
for subsequent daily and weekly sessions.Results and discussion
The ﬁndings are organized according to the three
kinds of forecasting formats used by the participants:
point, directional, and interval. In each instance, we
discuss the implications of the results for the basic
questions set out initially, the expectations, format, and
explanation questions.
Point forecasts
One of the most commonly used measures of overall
point judgment accuracy is the median absolute percent-
age error (MdAPE; cf., Armstrong & Collopy, 1992). Its
0–100 range is one of its primary attractions, for it permits
easy comparisons across quantities that have radically
diﬀerent scales, as in the present study, e.g., US dollars vs.
Japanese yen vs. Turkish lira. Thus,MdAPEwas the index
employed here to evaluate the accuracy of our partici-
pants point forecasts of FX rates. The absolute percent-
age error (APE) for a given instance is deﬁned as follows:
APE ¼ 100 jðx rÞ=rj; ð1Þ
where in the present context, x is the forecasters pre-
diction of the exchange rate in question and r is the
actual or ‘‘realized’’ rate. MdAPE is simply the median
value of APE over the pertinent collection of judgment
cases. Clearly, a forecasters goal is to minimize MdAPE,
since in the ideal case, x ¼ r.
Table 1 summarizes the median values of MdAPE
achieved by the professional and amateur forecasters for
both horizons, one day and one week. It also shows the
ranges of those statistics. As the table indicates, the
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than the amateurs judgments numerically, although the
professional-amateur diﬀerences were highly signiﬁcant
statistically for both horizons, per Mann–Whitney U
tests. The table also shows that, as one might expect
intuitively, for both the professionals and the amateurs,
one-day-ahead predictions were far more accurate than
one-week-ahead forecasts, according to Wilcoxon
signed-ranks tests.1
These results indicate that it is indeed reasonable to
expect that professional FX forecasters will outperform
even amateurs who are cognizant of FX ﬁnancial theory
and have extensive ﬁrst-hand, personal experience in
local FX markets. Nevertheless, the data do not suggest
that the advantage is a substantial one in absolute terms.
The ranges of the MdAPE values are noteworthy in this
respect, too. Observe in Table 1, for instance, that the
weekly point forecasts of the best professional forecaster
were far superior to those of the best amateur. Yet, the
least successful professional had less accurate weekly
forecasts than the least successful amateur. So, practi-
cally, a ‘‘consumer’’ of point FX forecasting services (an
individual or an organization) in a situation like that
which existed in Turkey at the time of the study prob-
ably should think hard about the tradeoﬀs between the
costs of expertise and what that expertise might aﬀord in
terms of improved decisions. That consumer would also
be wise to verify the actual expertise of any source of
judgments under consideration—professional or other-
wise (including the consumer him-or herself).
On average, both the professional and the amateur
participants expected that 20% of their point forecasts
would exactly match the actual values of the FX rates
they were trying to anticipate, for both one-day and one-
week horizons.2 The median actual percentages of exact
matches were 6% for daily forecasts and 2% for weekly
forecasts, for both professionals and amateurs. Not
surprisingly, the diﬀerences between expectations and
actual matches were highly signiﬁcant statistically
(p < :001), strongly implicating a particular kind of
overconﬁdence.
Another measure of overall point judgment accuracy
is the mean squared error (MSE), which is deﬁned as
follows:
MSE ¼ ð1=NÞ
X
ðx rÞ2; ð2Þ1 The sampling distributions for many of the statistics commonly
used in analyses of judgment accuracy have not been studied and hence
are not well understood. We thus report conservative non-parametric
tests even though the results of stricter parametric procedures yielded
consistent conclusions.
2 Strictly speaking, if the participant conceptualized each rate in
question as a truly continuous quantity, the sensible expectation was
zero. But because of necessary and customary rounding, rates are not,
in fact, fully continuous but rather discrete. Thus, as the realization
data show, a zero expectation is not fully warranted.where the summation extends over all N cases the
forecaster considers. As suggested previously, one
drawback to MSE relative to MdAPE is that its nu-
merical values may be diﬃcult to interpret when the
quantities of concern lie along scales that have diﬀerent
ranges. But one advantage of MSE is that, like similar
statistics in regression analyses, it is decomposable into
meaningful elements that oﬀer additional insights
about various aspects of forecasting performance. In
particular, Theil (1966) showed that the following is
true
MSE¼ ðx rÞ2þðSDx SDrÞ2þ 2ð1 rxrÞSDxSDr: ð3Þ
In Eq. (3), in the present context x and r are the
means of the predicted and realized values of the FX
rates in question, respectively, and SDx and SDr are their
standard deviations. And rxr is the correlation between
predicted and actual rates. Thus, the ‘‘Theil decompo-
sition’’ indicates that the overall accuracy of point
forecasts is a function of three distinct tendencies on the
part of the forecaster: (a) the tendency to over- or un-
derpredict actual rates (x vs. r); (b) the tendency to of-
fer forecasts whose variability matches (or fails to
match) that of actual FX rates (SDx vs. SDr); and (c) the
tendency for forecasted rates to covary with actual
rates (rxr).
Values of MdAPE and MSE do not always point
toward the same conclusions about the overall accu-
racy of particular sets of judgments, and such was the
case here (e.g., professionals forecasts yielded statisti-
cally signiﬁcantly better values of MSE than amateurs
forecasts only for one-week-ahead forecasts, whereas
MdAPE had shown better values for both one-day-
ahead and one-week-ahead predictions). Since MdAPE
provides a unit-free measure that trims outliers, while
MSE remains aﬀected by changes in units as well as
extreme errors, such diﬀerences are to be expected for
the kinds of FX rates studied. For the most part,
MdAPE is a more suitable measure of overall accuracy
when these diﬀerences exist. But the elements of point
forecasting accuracy implicated by the Theil decom-
position of MSE can be informative for our explanation
question nevertheless.
Table 2 displays the median values of the key statis-
tics distinguished in the Theil decomposition. The table
shows that one-day-ahead point forecasts by both
professionals and amateurs were better than one-week-
ahead forecasts with respect to all three accuracy
dimensions. And that display indicates that profession-
al-amateur diﬀerences were statistically signiﬁcant only
for one-week horizons. Interestingly, the amateur fore-
casts were better than the professional predictions with
respect to over- and underprediction of FX rates;
squared diﬀerences of mean forecasts and actual rates
were smaller for the amateur participants. It was the
other two dimensions that carried the day for the
3 For two-event partitions of sample spaces, such as those here,
peoples probability judgments for the alternative events generally do
sum to 1.0 even though the underlying judgment processes are
sometimes not as simple as such reports might suggest (Windschitl,
2000).
Table 2
Medians of Theil decomposition elements of mean-squared-error
(MSE) values for point forecasts by professional and amateur fore-
casters, for one-day and one-week horizons
Horizon Forecaster group
Professionals Amateurs
One day ðx rÞ2: 5337a ðx rÞ2: 3713a
ðSDx  SDrÞ2: 8084a ðSDx  SDrÞ2: 7673a
rxr: .999a rxr: .999a
One ðx rÞ2: 190,062 ðx rÞ2: 44,315c
week ðSDx  SDrÞ2: 66,465b ðSDx  SDrÞ2: 93,826
rxr: .999b rxr: .999
Note. x, point forecast of FX rate; r, actual, realized rate.
aOne-day horizon better than one-week horizon per Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test.
b Professionals better than amateurs per Mann–Whitney U test.
cAmateurs better than professionals per Mann–Whitney U test.
* p < :05.
** p < :01.
*** p < :001.
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covariance. Most importantly, the squared diﬀerences in
the standard deviations of forecasted and actual rates
were on average smaller for the professionals than for
the amateurs.
The correlations between participants forecasts and
the corresponding actual FX rates (rxr) were especially
intriguing. As indicated in Table 2, those correlations
were astonishingly high across the board, with the
medians reported in the table being within .001 of
perfect values of 1.0. In fact, the diﬀerences in those
median values do not appear until the fourth decimal
place. However, the ranges of correlation values were
relatively wide (i.e., for professionals, one-day horizon
[.9341, .9999], one-week horizon [.9437, .9999]; for
amateurs, one-day horizon [.8916, .9999], one-week
horizon [.5051, .9999]). In fact, statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences (in Fisher z-transformed correlation coeﬃ-
cients) revealed (1) higher correlations for daily fore-
casts as compared to weekly forecasts for both
professionals and amateurs (p < :001 for both), and (2)
professionals showing a better correlation than ama-
teurs for one-week-ahead forecasts (p ¼ :001). As dis-
cussed by Sheskin (2000), such seemingly inﬂated rxr
values almost certainly resulted from the extremely
wide range of data values observed (e.g., from 1.1372
for Swiss franc/US dollar to 90,947 for Turkish lira/
British pound at the time this study was conducted). In
such circumstances, the correlation coeﬃcient is not
an informative indicator of forecasting performance
(Armstrong, 2001). Thus, we essentially ignored the
correlation values and concentrated on the remaining
measures distinguished in the Theil decomposition.
And the ﬁndings revealed that the tendency to over- or
under-predict the realized rates, along with the ten-dency to oﬀer predictions with a degree of variability
matching that of the realized rates, discriminated most
the point forecasting performance of professionals and
amateurs.
Directional forecasts
Two parallel analyses of directional forecasts were
performed. The alternative analyses are distinguished by
how a given participants predictions were encoded, in-
ternally vs. externally. Recall that, for a given FX rate,
the participant predicted whether the rate would (a)
‘‘increase’’ or else (b) ‘‘decrease or remain the same.’’ In
‘‘internal coding’’ as instantiated here, the target event in
questionwasA¼ ‘‘Mypredicted directionwill prove to be
correct,’’ and such predictions tend to diﬀer from one
instance to the next. This is the kind of coding entailed in
most studies of, for instance, overconﬁdence in general
knowledge (e.g., concerning almanac questions like,
‘‘Which is farther north, (a) New York or (b) London?’’).
In contrast, in ‘‘external coding’’ (such as that used in
weather forecasting), the focal target event is speciﬁed in
advance and is the same for every case. In the present
research, after the fact and for purposes of analysis, we
established a convention such that the target event was
A ¼ ‘‘The rate will increase.’’ For a given case, if the
participant predicted a rate increase and reported a
‘‘probability-correct judgment’’ P 0ðAÞ ¼ P P 50%, then
we set P 0ðAÞ ¼ P . On the other hand, if the participant
predicted a rate decrease and speciﬁed P 0ðAÞ ¼ Q > 50%,
we followed normal convention, assumed additivity, and
set P 0ðAÞ ¼ 1 Q.3 The reason for performing the dual
analyses is that, as noted by Yates (1982), various com-
monly used accuracy statistics have diﬀerent (and some-
times problematic) interpretations depending on the kind
of coding employed.
Overall accuracy. The probability score (PS) is the
most popular means for evaluating the accuracy of
probability judgments for discrete events, such as whe-
ther an exchange rate will increase or that ones pre-
dicted directional change will prove correct. Following
custom, let f be the probability judgment in question
and let d denote an ‘‘outcome index,’’ which assumes the
value 1 if the target event occurs and 0 otherwise. It
sometimes helps intuition to think of d as the proba-
bility judgment of a clairvoyant, who reports 100%
certainty when the target event in question is going to
occur and 0% otherwise. Then we have
PS ¼ ðf  dÞ2: ð4Þ
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in that instance, judgment is ideal; there is a perfect
match between the forecasters judgment and that of the
clairvoyant. And the worst possible performance is in-
dicated when PS ¼ 1. The usual measure of accuracy
over a given collection of judgment cases is the mean of
the probability score for each of the individual cases, PS,
often described as the ‘‘Brier (1950) score.’’ It is
straightforward to show that the value of PS for any
particular set of judgments is the same regardless of
whether coding is internal or external, and thus a single
analysis of overall accuracy is suﬃcient.
Table 3 presents the median values of PS achieved by
the professional and amateur participants for both their
one-day and one-week forecasts. It also shows the ran-
ges of those statistics. We see that the professionals were
signiﬁcantly more accurate in their directional proba-
bilistic forecasts than the amateurs, especially so in the
case of one-week horizons. Nevertheless, as revealed by
the ranges, there was considerable overlap in PS values
for our professional and amateur participants. It is plain
to see that the best professional was more accurate than
the best amateur. On the other hand, the accuracy of the
best amateur was far superior to that of the worst pro-
fessional and even the average professional. All of these
indications were consistent with those revealed for point
forecasts. But for horizon eﬀects, the indications were
markedly diﬀerent. Recall that one-day-ahead point
forecasts were signiﬁcantly more accurate than one-
week-ahead forecasts in that same format. The exact
opposite was true for directional probabilistic forecasts.
Observe that, for both the professionals and amateurs,
the median values of PS were distinctly lower (i.e., better)
for the weekly forecasts than for the daily forecasts.
The values of PS themselves allow direct accuracy
comparisons of professionals to amateurs and of one-
day horizons to one-week horizons. But it is not im-
mediately obvious what those statistics tell us about how
accurate our participants were in ‘‘objective’’ terms.
Various standards, such as those shown on the right-Table 3
Median values [ranges] of mean probability scores PS, indexing the overall acc
forecasters, for one-day and one-week horizons
Horizon Forecaster group S
Professionals Amateurs U
One day .195b .225 .
[.120, .288] [.155, .309]
One week .176a ;b .185a .
[.112, .293] [.132, .259]
Note. Smaller values of PS better.
aOne-week horizon better than one-day horizon per Wilcoxon signed-ra
b Professionals better than amateurs per Mann–Whitney U test.
* p < :05.
** p < :01.
*** p < :001.hand side of Table 3, thus provide essential reference
points. Each of the standards shown there refers to the
accuracy level that would have been achieved by a
particular kind of ﬁctional ‘‘constant judge,’’ one who
would have reported the same probability for every case
considered (cf., Yates, 1990, pp. 43–44). A ‘‘uniform
judge’’ is one who says that all of the alternative speci-
ﬁed events are equally likely. (We might imagine a real
forecaster adopting the uniform judges strategy and
conceding, ‘‘Since I know so little, why dont I just say
that all possibilities have the same probability?’’) So, in
the present instance, where there were two alternatives
(i.e., that a rate would ‘‘increase’’ vs. ‘‘decrease or re-
main the same’’), the reported judgment for the target
event would be .50. As is apparent from Eq. (4), a uni-
form judge (in the two-alternative situation) necessarily
always achieves PS ¼ :25. And as Table 3 shows, on
average, the professional and amateur participants, for
both one-day and one-week horizons, surpassed the
standard set by the uniform judge. But also note that, as
indicated by the ranges of PS values, not every forecaster
met that standard. The least accurate amateur and
professional participants fell short of this modest
benchmark.
A ‘‘historical judge’’ sets a more stringent yardstick.
This is an individual who reports that the probability for
the target event in a given instance is the relative fre-
quency or ‘‘historical base rate’’ (HBR) with which that
event occurred in a particular collection of similar past
cases. Recall that, as possible aids, the present partici-
pants were provided with graphs and tables displaying
past values of each of the FX rates they were asked to
forecast. In principle, each participant could have
computed the relative frequencies of directional rate
changes from those records and then reported for every
case, say, P 0(Increase)¼HBR, the historical base rate of
FX rate increases implicit in the available records. The
labor required to do that precisely would, of course, be
prohibitive. But roughly estimating the historical base
rates from those data was not out of the question. In anyuracy of probabilistic directional forecasts by professional and amateur
tandard
niform judge Historical judge Base rate judge
250 .202 .182
250 .212 .202
nks test.
Table 4
Median values [ranges] of the bias statistic ðf  dÞ for internally coded
probability judgments, indexing case-level, in-the-moment over- or
underconﬁdence in probabilistic directional forecasts by professional
and amateur forecasters, for one-day and one-week horizons
Horizon Forecaster group
Professionals Amateurs
One day ).023b ;c .051
[).188, .175] [).122, .234]
One week .031 .040a
[).235, .290] [).113, .181]
Note. Internal coding: target event A¼ ‘‘My predicted direction
will prove to be correct’’; f , probabilistic judgment; d ¼ 1 if actually
correct, d ¼ 0 otherwise, Bias ¼ 0 ideally, indicating neither overcon-
ﬁdence nor underconﬁdence.
aOne-week-ahead forecasts less overconﬁdent that one-day-ahead
forecasts per Wilcoxon signed-ranks test.
bOne-day-ahead forecasts less overconﬁdent that one-week-ahead
forecasts per Wilcoxon signed-ranks test.
c Professionals less overconﬁdent than amateurs per Mann–
Whitney U test.
* p < :05.
** p < :01.
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for amateurs making one-day-ahead predictions—did
the median participant fail to meet the standard set by
the pertinent historical judge. Nevertheless, the least
accurate professional and amateur forecasters fell far
short of the mark established by the historical judge for
both one-day and one-week horizons.
What is commonly called simply a ‘‘base rate
judge’’ imposes an even more exacting standard. Sup-
pose that, somehow, it were possible to anticipate the
relative frequency or base rate with which a target
event actually occurs in the current, given collection of
cases, the sample base rate (SBR). Then the base rate
judge—a kind of ‘‘semi-clairvoyant’’—would report
SBR as the probabilistic forecast for every individual
case within that sample. For instance, suppose that (a)
the target event is an increase in the focal FX rate, (b)
the forecaster will consider 100 cases, and (c), for ex-
actly 55 of those cases, the rate does indeed increase,
yielding SBR¼ .55. Then the base rate judge would
report P 0(Increase)¼ .55 for every one of the 100 cases
of concern. Now, no one can realistically expect any
human forecaster to know in advance what will be the
base rate for any particular sample of cases, and hence
precise application of the base rate judges strategy is
impossible. Yet, in principle, that semi-clairvoyant
strategy could be approximated by, for instance,
starting with the historical base rate and adjusting it
according to ones hunches as to how conditions dur-
ing the present sample of cases diﬀer systematically
from those during the time when the historical base
rate was compiled, i.e., reporting the estimate
SBR0 ¼HBR+D, where D is an adjustment per current
conditions. As Table 3 indicates, neither the amateur
nor the professional participants, on average, outper-
formed the base rate judge for the one-day-ahead di-
rectional probabilistic forecasts. But interestingly, both
outperformed the base rate judge for one-week-ahead
predictions. Once again, though, there were substantial
individual diﬀerences such that the least accurate
forecasters were greatly outperformed by the pertinent
base rate judges.
In terms of the expectations question, the results
clearly indicate that it would be most reasonable to
anticipate that, in general, professionals probabilistic
directional forecasts would be superior to those of am-
ateurs. It is impossible to directly compare the accuracy
of point and probabilistic directional forecasts. Yet, the
patterns of the results make it apparent that, speaking to
the format question, forecast format makes a big dif-
ference. For, although daily point forecasts were more
accurate than weekly point forecasts, the opposite was
true for directional probabilistic predictions. Analyses
of various dimensions of overall probability judgment
accuracy, to which we turn next, allow for insights about
the explanation question.Dimensional accuracy—the internal coding perspec-
tive. As described below (cf., Yates, 1982), there exist
several schemes for decomposing PS into informative
components. But when coding is internal, the compo-
nent that is most cleanly interpreted is one called ‘‘bias’’
and is indexed by the following statistic
Bias ¼ f  d; ð5Þ
where, using the notation introduced in Eq. (4), f is the
mean probability judgment reported for the event in
question and d is the mean of the outcome index. Since d
is 1 when the pertinent event occurs and 0 when it does
not, it is clear that d is the same as the proportion of
times that the target event actually occurs. Thus, the
bias statistic is an indicator of the extent to which the
forecaster, in eﬀect, over- or underpredicts the target
event. Recall that, for internal coding in the present
instance, the target event was, from the forecasters
perspective, A¼ ‘‘My predicted direction (for an FX
rate change) will prove to be correct.’’ Therefore, it
is reasonable to interpret the bias statistic as a measure
of case-level, in-the-moment overconﬁdence when it
is positive and an index of underconﬁdence when it is
negative. (The ‘‘case-level, in-the-moment’’ qualiﬁer is
explained later.)
As shown in Table 4, the participants were generally
overconﬁdent, but with one exception—when the pro-
fessionals were making one-day-ahead predictions. In
this latter instance, there was a tendency for forecasts to
be slightly underconﬁdent. The amateur participants
were typically more overconﬁdent than their professional
counterparts, although the diﬀerence was statistically
signiﬁcant only in the case of daily forecasts. (Experience
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more overconﬁdent for their weekly forecasts relative to
their daily forecasts (which were actually underconﬁ-
dent), the opposite was true for the amateurs.
The results summarized in Table 5 oﬀer a diﬀerent
perspective on the notions of over- and underconﬁdence.
Each cell in the table ﬁrst presents the median value of
the participants personally articulated expected per-
centages of correct directional forecasts, expressed as
proportions to permit easier comparisons to Table 4.
The table also shows the corresponding actual or real-
ized percentages of correct directional predictions as
well as the diﬀerences between the expected and realized
percentages. In parallel to the previous bias statistics,
such diﬀerences measure a second, ‘‘aggregate-level,
anticipation’’ variety of overconﬁdence (when positive)
or underconﬁdence (when negative). The statistics pre-
sented earlier in Table 4 rested on the judgments that
participants rendered at the very moment when each
individual FX case was considered (e.g., ‘‘The US dol-
lar/Japanese yen rate will increase next week, and Im
80% sure that that will happen’’). On the other hand,
those in Table 5 derived from the participants aggregate
percentage-correct estimate in advance of considering
any concrete cases (e.g., ‘‘About 60% of my directional
predictions will prove correct’’). Table 5 shows that, in
terms of the accuracy of categorical directional forecasts
per se, the predictions of the professionals were signiﬁ-
cantly better than those of the amateurs, for both the
one-week horizon and especially the one-day horizon.
Recall from Table 4 that participants were typically
overconﬁdent in the individual, case-level directional
forecasts they oﬀered at the times when they actually
deliberated those cases. In marked contrast, the Table 5
comparisons, between expected and realized percent-Table 5
Median values of personally expected and realized percentages correct
(expressed as proportions) for probabilistic directional forecasts
by professional and amateur forecasters, for one-day and one-week
horizons
Horizon Forecaster group
Professionals Amateurs
One day Expected: .600 Expected: .600
Realized: .733a ;b Realized: .640
Diﬀerence: ).133 Diﬀerence: ).040
One week Expected: .500 Expected: .600
Realized:.740a ;b Realized: .700b
Diﬀerence: ).240 Diﬀerence: ).100
a Professionals better than amateurs per Mann–Whitney U test.
bRealized% correct higher than expected% correct, implying ag-
gregate-level, anticipation underconﬁdence per Wilcoxon signed-ranks
test.
* p < :05.
** p < :01.
*** p < :001.ages, reveal pervasive underconﬁdence in aggregate-level,
personally expressed expectations, for the professional
participants in particular.
The discrepancy between the two diﬀerent kinds of
over- and underconﬁdence shown here—‘‘case-level,
in-the-moment’’ vs. ‘‘aggregate-level, anticipation’’—is
reminiscent of similar diﬀerences revealed in previous
research. A good example is the study reported by Lee et
al. (1995). These investigators required participants to
perform the type of task common in most studies of
general knowledge overconﬁdence (e.g., ‘‘Potatoes grow
better in (a) warm or (b) cool weather? Now, how sure
are you (50–100%) that your chosen answer is actually
correct?’’). The participants also performed a peer
comparison task in which they estimated the percentage
of their peers to whom they were superior in various
domains (e.g., writing skills). Lee et al. found virtually
no correlation between the two diﬀerent varieties of
over- and underconﬁdence they observed, and they
concluded that those constructs rest on qualitatively
diﬀerent mechanisms. The same conclusion is reasonable
here. Thus, the overconﬁdence revealed for individual
probabilistic directional FX forecasts likely arise from
factors such as the forecaster failing to bring to mind, in
the moment, speciﬁc arguments that disagree with the
forecasters expected rate change direction. In contrast,
when the forecaster must estimate how many of his or
her direction predictions will prove correct in a collec-
tion of 50, the forecaster plausibly draws on recollec-
tions of what happened in generically similar situations
in the past (cf., Gigerenzer, Hoﬀrage, & Kleinb€olting,
1991).
It also seems reasonable that the diﬀerences in the
indications of over- and underconﬁdence evident in
Tables 4 and 5 are at least partly due to the elicitation of
0–100% probability judgments for individual forecasts
but 0–50 frequency estimates for personal expectations.
Price (1998), in a general knowledge study, obtained
results completely parallel to the ones reported here. In
Prices instantiation of the frequency format, for any
given question, he asked the participant: ‘‘Out of 100
questions for which you felt this certain of the answer,
how many would you answer correctly?’’ This format
resulted in much lower overconﬁdence than the usual
probabilistic judgment format. Price, too, argued that it
is likely that the alternative formats induce diﬀerent
kinds of reasoning that are diﬀerentially susceptible to
overconﬁdence.
Another aspect of the results presented in Table 5 is
noteworthy, too, one that bears directly on the format
question. Observe that the realized percentages of cor-
rect directional predictions were quite good, ranging
from 64 to 74%. But recall the earlier Theil decompo-
sition analysis of the participants point forecasts. In
particular, consider once again the correlations (rxr)
between the participants forecasts and the actual values
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correlation coeﬃcients were astronomical, on average,
nearly 1.0. Such correlations should translate to correct
directional prediction percentages substantially higher
than the ones that participants actually achieved (cf.,
Kendall, 1948). This discrepancy suggests that partici-
pants necessarily possessed the knowledge required to
support the superb directional forecasts implicit in the
point forecasts they reported when given an instruction
equivalent to, ‘‘What do you think that rate will be?’’
Yet, the demand to exercise their abilities explicitly, in
response to a request amounting to, ‘‘Do you think that
rate will increase?’’ somehow caused that knowledge to
become misdirected.
Dimensional accuracy—the external coding perspec-
tive. One well-known scheme for analyzing the accuracy
of probability judgments derives from the Murphy
(1973) decomposition of the mean probability score,
whose formal expression is given in Appendix B. Fig. 1
(cf., Yates, 1994) provides a heuristic way to think about
what the Murphy decomposition can reveal about how
the present participants plausibly arrived at their par-
ticular levels of probabilistic forecasting accuracy. In the
schematic shown there, as before, d is the base rate for
the target event. CI is the ‘‘calibration index,’’ which is
deﬁned in Appendix B, and DI is the ‘‘discrimination
index,’’ whose analytic deﬁnition is also given in
Appendix B.
The ﬁrst accuracy dimension distinguished in the
Murphy decomposition is a particular kind of task dif-
ﬁculty. A target event (when there are two alternatives)
whose base rate (d in the present notation) is close to
50% is inherently harder to predict than one whose base
rate is close to 0% or 100%; there is less fundamental
uncertainty, in the intuitive and information theoryFig. 1. Schematic representation of overall probabilistic judgment accuracy an
mean probability score.senses of the term. As the expression for the decompo-
sition shows (i.e., outcome index variance¼Var(d)¼
dð1 dÞ), the greater is this uncontrollable uncertainty
(i.e., the closer is d to .5), then the worse (i.e., higher) is
PS, through no fault or virtue of the forecaster when the
target event is externally coded, such as when A ¼ ‘‘The
rate will increase,’’ as in the present instance. Therefore,
legitimate accuracy comparisons of one group of
forecasters to another (e.g., professionals to amateurs)
or forecasts in one context to those in another (e.g.,
for one-day-ahead vs. one-week-ahead predictions)
should focus on the remaining, controllable accuracy
dimensions.
Probability judgments are said to be ‘‘well calibrated’’
to the extent that the numerical values attached to those
judgments match the relative frequencies with which the
target event actually occurs. Thus, suppose there are 50
occasions on each of which a weather forecaster says
there is a 40% chance that precipitation will occur within
the next 12 hours. Then, if that forecasters judgments
are perfectly calibrated, precipitation will in fact be
observed on exactly 20—that is, 40%—of those occa-
sions. Clearly, calibration is a judgment accuracy di-
mension under a forecasters control. It is measured by
the calibration index, CI . We see in Table 6 that cali-
bration was signiﬁcantly better for the professional
participants, but only when the horizon was one day
away.
Discrimination is the other accuracy dimension dis-
tinguished in the Murphy decomposition of PS. As de-
scribed in Fig. 1, discrimination has nothing to do with
the speciﬁc numbers a forecaster uses in expressing his
or her opinions about what is going to happen in the
future. Instead, it concerns the non-numerical associa-
tion between the qualitatively diﬀerent things thed its elements as discerned in the Murphy (1973) decomposition of the
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occurs in the future, on the other. The discrimination
index, DI , measures the degree of discrimination a
forecaster achieves. As noted in Appendix B, the fact
that discrimination is about non-numerical association
is reﬂected in the formal connection between DI and the
Pearson v2 statistic commonly used in contingency table
analyses. Table 6 shows that the discrimination exhib-
ited by the professional participants was superior to that
of the amateurs for the one-day horizons and especially
the one-week horizons. Good discrimination requires
two main things. The ﬁrst is access to information that is
reliably associated with the target event—valid ‘‘cues’’ in
the common parlance of the judgment literature. In this
context, this would include facts that, for whatever
reason, tend to be correlated with FX rate changes. The
second prerequisite for good discrimination is knowl-
edge and skill at actually using such predictive cues,
including mere attention to those cues. Accessibility is
often out of the forecasters control. Therefore, one
plausible reason that the professional forecasters might
have exhibited superior discrimination is that their af-
ﬁliated institutions or companies made readily available
to them useful facts that are less available to amateurs.
But the professionals might also have, over time, ac-
quired routines for more appropriately interpreting facts
accessible to both professionals and amateurs.
The covariance decomposition of PS provides an-
other, more ﬁne-grained means for analyzing overall
probability judgment accuracy into usefully distin-
guished components (Yates, 1982). Fig. 2 sketches the
various accuracy dimensions distinguished in the co-
variance decomposition. As is immediately apparent,
the ﬁrst component, concerning incidence diﬃculty, isTable 6
Median values [ranges] of calibration (CI) and discrimination (DI)
indexes for externally coded probabilistic directional forecasts by
professional and amateur forecasters, for one-day and one-week ho-
rizons
Horizon Forecaster group
Professionals Amateurs
One day CI: .047b CI : .072
[.017, .134] [.012, .163]
DI: .022b DI: .019
[.004, .090] [.001, .086]
One week CI: .044 CI : .035a
[.002, .184] [.003, .119]
DI: .054a ;b DI: .031a
[.004, .311] [.003, .094]
Note. External coding: target event A*¼ ‘‘the rate will increase’’;
smaller values of CI better; larger values of DI better.
aOne-week horizon better than one-day horizon per Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test.
b Professionals better than amateurs per Mann–Whitney U test.
* p < :05.
** p < :01.
*** p < :001.shared with the Murphy decomposition. The others,
however, are diﬀerent. The equations for those elements
as well as for the decomposition itself are presented in
Appendix B.
Formally, the bias component is identical to the one
discussed before. Here, however, the target event is
diﬀerent. Recall that, in the previous discussion of in-
ternal coding, the target was A¼ ‘‘My predicted direc-
tion will prove to be correct.’’ In the present external
coding context, it is A ¼ ‘‘The rate will increase.’’ That
is why the appropriate interpretation of the Bias statistic
in this context is that it describes the degree to which a
forecaster tends to overpredict FX rate increases (when
the statistic is positive) or underpredict such increases
(when it is negative). Bias reﬂects a coarse variety of
calibration (sometimes called ‘‘calibration in the large’’)
and, as suggested in Fig. 2, is largely controllable. As
indicated in Table 7, both the professionals and ama-
teurs tended to underpredict FX increases, and signiﬁ-
cantly more so in the case of one-day-ahead forecasts.
Although the bias within the daily forecasts was statis-
tically signiﬁcantly better for the professionals than for
the amateurs, for the most part, bias did not sharply
distinguish the forecasting performance of professionals
and amateurs.
Suppose that, for a given forecaster, two distributions
of probabilistic judgments f ¼ P 0 (Increase) were con-
structed, where ‘‘Increase’’ means that the FX rates in
question will increase. The ﬁrst distribution consists of
judgments rendered in cases where the pertinent rates
eventually did indeed increase. The second distribution
is comprised of similar judgments in the opposite kinds
of cases, when the rates of concern did not increase. For
a clairvoyant, all the judgments in the former ‘‘condi-
tional’’ distribution would have been f ¼ 1:0, whereas
every one in the latter would have been f ¼ 0. Suppose
that we denote the mean of the judgment distribution
conditional on an actual rate increase by f1 and that for
the distribution conditional on an actual non-increase
by f0. Then for a clairvoyant, the diﬀerence in these
means, f1  f0, is necessarily 1.0. A real, human fore-
caster can only approximate this ideal. To the extent
that the diﬀerence—called the ‘‘slope’’—does indeed ap-
proach the ideal of 1.0, in eﬀect, the forecaster has ap-
proached maximum separation of the conditional
distributions, the same as a clairvoyant. In order to do
this, the forecaster must have access and pay attention
to cues that have a reliable relationship to FX rate
changes. The forecaster must also be skilled at attaching
appropriate numerical labels to forecasts. Thus, the
separation construct is a particular combination of the
discrimination and calibration constructs distinguished
in the Murphy decomposition. As shown in Table 7,
separation was clearly the primary means by which the
professionals in the present study outshone the ama-
teurs, for both the one-day and one-week horizons.
Table 7
Median values [ranges] of Bias, Slope, and Scat statistics for externally
coded probabilistic directional forecasts by professional and amateur
forecasters, for one-day and one-week horizons
Horizon Forecaster group
Professionals Amateurs
One day Bias: ).129b Bias: ).163
[).258, .006] [).246, .005]
Slope: .105b Slope: .035
[).048, .353] [).151, .250]
Scat: .032 Scat: .030
[.006, .114] [.007, .096]
One week Bias: ).036a Bias: ).054a
[).175, .110] [).162, .085]
Slope: .195a ;b Slope: .128a
[).073, .447] [).021, .356]
Scat: .034 Scat: .032
[.007, .135] [.008, .107]
Note. External coding: target event A ¼ ‘‘The rate will increase’’;
Bias ¼ 0 ideally; larger values of Slope better; smaller values of Scat
better.
aOne-week horizon better than one-day horizon per Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test.
b Professionals better than amateurs per Mann–Whitney U test.
* p < :05.
** p < :01.
*** p < :001.
Fig. 2. Schematic representation of overall probabilistic judgment accuracy and its elements as discerned in the covariance decomposition of the
mean probability score.
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made weekly directional probabilistic forecasts so much
better than daily forecasts (see Table 3 for overall ac-
curacy comparisons), even though the outcome index
variance was higher for the weekly as compared to the
daily realized values.
‘‘Noise’’ is the ﬁnal accuracy dimension distinguished
in the covariance decomposition of PS. Analogous to
error variance in the analysis of variance, the noiseconstruct refers to variability in an individuals proba-
bilistic forecasts that is unrelated to ‘‘the truth,’’ that is,
whether the FX rates in question in actuality increase or
fail to increase. Noise can arise in either or both of two
ways. On one hand, it can be a manifestation of pure
unreliability in the forecasters judgment processes. Such
unreliability would be revealed in inconsistencies be-
tween the predictions the forecaster oﬀers on two dif-
ferent occasions when presented with identical facts. It is
hard to imagine perfect replications of real-life FX
conditions, but conceptually, the idea is the same as that
of parallel forms of a psychological test. Unreliability
would be manifested to the extent that the test–retest
reliability coeﬃcient, rtt, was less than 1.0. In principle,
the pure unreliability basis for noise is controllable. One
approach to doing this is to replace the human fore-
caster by a bootstrapping model of that person (cf.,
Dawes, 1979). Noise can also occur even when a fore-
caster is perfectly reliable in the test–retest reliability
sense. In particular, suppose that the cues or informa-
tion the forecaster uses to form his or her forecasts are
themselves only weakly associated with the target event.
Then this guarantees that the forecasters judgments
cannot be strongly related to the target event either.
As shown in Appendix B, in the covariance decom-
position of PS, noise is indexed by a weighted mean of
the variances of the distributions of probabilistic fore-
casts conditional on the target event occurring and not
occurring, respectively, a statistic called ‘‘scatter’’ and
denoted by Scat. We see in Table 7 that the values of
Scat were virtually identical for the professional and
amateur forecasters and for the one-day and one-week
horizons. The professional-amateur null eﬀect is espe-
cially noteworthy. The reason is that, in the studies of
stock price and earnings forecasting by Yaniv, Yates,
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between experienced and novice forecasters. In those
studies, the more experienced forecasters were less ac-
curate than their less experienced counterparts because
their judgments were noisier. We address this most in-
teresting diﬀerence in results in General discussion.
Interval forecasts
The ‘‘inclusion rate’’ for a forecasters interval fore-
casts is the proportion of times that the intervals artic-
ulated by the forecaster actually capture the true values
of the quantities in question. From this perspective,
overall interval forecasting accuracy is good to the ex-
tent that the inclusion rate is close to the ideal of 1.0.
Table 8 shows that, in these terms, the interval forecasts
of both the professional and amateur participants were
signiﬁcantly more accurate for the one-day horizon than
for the one-week horizon. This table also indicates that
there were no reliable professional-vs.-amateur diﬀer-
ences in the accuracy of interval predictions for either
horizon. Thus, in terms of our expectations question,Table 8
Median values [ranges] of actual and expected inclusion rates, Log
Widths, and Normalized Errors for 90% credible intervals reported
by professional and amateur forecasters, for one-day and one-week
horizons
Horizon Forecaster group
Professionals Amateurs
One day Actual inclusion
rate: .540a
Actual inclusion rate:
.560a
[.160, .940] [.122, .880]
Expected inclusion
rate: .600
Expected inclusion
rate: .600
Log Width: .682a Log Width: 1.066a
[).367, 2.996] [)1.613, 2.303]
Normalized Error:
.520a
Normalized Error:
.445a
[.071, 2.550] [.143, 5.000]
One week Actual inclusion
rate: .440
Actual inclusion rate:
.400
[.140, 1.000] [.040, .760]
Expected inclusion
rate: .500
Expected inclusion
rate: .600b
Log Width: 1.498 Log Width: 1.431
[)3.404, 4.700] [)3.817, 2.708]
Normalized Error:
.664
Normalized Error:
.704
[.055, 13.033] [.278, 44.611]
Note. Inclusion rate¼ .90 ideally; smaller values of Log Width and
Normalized Error better.
aOne-day horizon better than one-week horizon per Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test.
b Expected rate higher than realized rate per Wilcoxon signed-ranks
test.
* p < :05.
** p < :01.
*** p < :001.there is no evidence that we should expect professional
forecasters to outperform the kinds of informed ama-
teurs employed in the present study, when it comes to
interval forecasts. Recall that, as in the present instance,
one-day-ahead point forecasts were more accurate than
one-week-ahead forecasts of that type. In contrast, the
opposite pattern was observed for directional forecasts.
Moreover, the lack of professional-amateur distinctions
in the case of interval forecast accuracy is diﬀerent from
what was seen for both point and directional forecasts.
Hence, once again, there are indications that, at mini-
mum, one answer to our format question is that formats
deﬁnitely make a diﬀerence in the way professionals
exhibit their forecasting expertise.
A trivial way that an FX forecaster can achieve per-
fect, 100% inclusion rates is to always report the entire
non-negative real line ½0;1Þ as a forecast interval. The
problem with this strategy, of course, is that such in-
tervals are completely uninformative and therefore
useless. This is the motivation for analytic schemes that
examine speciﬁc elements of overall interval forecasting
accuracy, schemes that also permit conclusions about
our explanation question.
Most discussions about the accuracy of probabilistic
interval forecasts focus on what is sometimes called
‘‘distribution calibration’’ (Yates, 1990, pp. 69–71). Thus,
as in the present research, 90% credible intervals would
exhibit perfect distribution calibration if their inclusion
rates were exactly 90%. As Table 8 makes clear, the dis-
tribution calibration of forecasts by both the professional
and amateur participants and for both the one-day and
one-week horizons was very weak; the inclusion rates fell
far short of .90. The particular form of distribution mis-
calibration observed here has been repeatedly reported
since Alpert and Raiﬀas (1982) work with general
knowledge questions, extending even to judges predicting
their own task performance (Connolly & Dean, 1997).
The common interpretation of this ﬁnding is that it re-
ﬂects interval overconﬁdence. The rationale for the ter-
minology in the current context would be that, for
instance, although the typical professional participant
was 90% sure that each of his or her one-day-ahead 90%
credible intervals would capture the FX rate in question,
only about 54% of those intervals actually did that. That
is, the forecaster was overly certain that the intervals he or
she constructed would capture the target rates.
The present ﬁndings oﬀer a somewhat diﬀerent per-
spective on distribution overconﬁdence. Table 8 shows
the medians of the participants explicitly articulated ex-
pected inclusion rates, based on their responses to the
question (seeMethod), ‘‘In howmany cases (out of 50) do
you expect the realized value to fall within your prediction
interval?’’ Despite the clear and understood speciﬁcation
that, for each interval, ‘‘you should be 90% conﬁdent’’
(see Appendix A), on average, expected inclusion rates
were much lower than .90. In fact, as shown in Table 8,
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teurs were forecasts overconﬁdent in the sense that actual
inclusion rates were statistically signiﬁcantly smaller than
self-reported expected rates. This result agrees with the
earlier ﬁndings for directional forecasts. Recall that an in-
the-moment forecast for an individual FX rate entailed
two stages. The participant ﬁrst predicted whether the
rate would ‘‘increase or not.’’ The participant then stated
a 50–100% probability judgment that that directional
predictionwould prove to be correct. These forecastswere
generally overconﬁdent in that the average probability
judgments outstripped the actual proportions of correc-
tion directional predictions (Table 4). The participants
were asked to explicitly predict their proportions of cor-
rect directional predictions, too. Those estimates turned
out being consistently smaller than the actual propor-
tions, that is, under conﬁdent.
In the very best of circumstances, a forecast interval
would be degenerate in a special way, one that captures
the true value of the quantity in question but whose
maximum and minimum values were the same. That is, it
would be a perfectly accurate point forecast. Short of that
ideal, a forecast interval is good to the degree that it
captures the realized value and is also narrow. This is the
intuition behind the measures of interval forecast accu-
racy proposed byYaniv and Foster (1995, 1997). The ﬁrst
measure is termed ‘‘informativeness’’ and is indexed by
the natural logarithm of a forecast intervals length:
Log Width ¼ lnðU  LÞ; ð6Þ
where U is the upper bound of the interval and L is its
lower bound. Clearly, all else being the same, one fore-
cast interval is better than another if its width is smaller.
That is, the forecasters aim is to minimize Log Width.
The second measure of Yaniv and Foster integrates both
point and interval forecasts:
Normalized Error ¼ ðjr  xjÞ=ðU  LÞ; ð7Þ
where, as before, x is the forecasters point forecast for a
particular FX rate and r is the actual or realized rate.
Again, it is apparent that minimization of Normalized
Error should be the forecasters goal. Observe in Table 8
that the results for informativeness and normalized error
mirror those for inclusion rates. That is, on each of these
dimensions, the participants interval forecasts were
better for one-day-ahead predictions than for one-week-
ahead predictions. Moreover, there were no statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the professionals and
amateurs.General discussion
Here we will summarize what the present data imply
for the expectations, format, and explanation questions
that were posed at the outset. We will also highlight key
aspects of those questions that remain unresolved.Expectations
The present ﬁndings demonstrate that FX rates are
not unpredictable. Participants were, on average, able to
surpass accuracy benchmarks of varying degrees of
stringency. Thus, we should not expect reasonably well-
informed FX forecasters—professional or otherwise—to
ﬂounder hopelessly. The results also indicate that we
should anticipate that, more often than not, profes-
sionals are capable of rendering more accurate FX
forecasts than sophisticated amateurs. Importantly, this
professional advantage apparently does not exist in
some domains, such as that of stock prices and earnings
(Sta€el von Holstein, 1972; Yates et al., 1991). To be sure,
there are important qualiﬁcations to the general con-
clusion that professionals enjoy an accuracy advantage
over amateurs when predicting FX rates. For one thing,
there is likely to be considerable overlap in the distri-
butions of forecasting competencies of populations of
professional and amateur FX forecasters. That is, many
amateurs will outperform many professionals. In prac-
tical terms, this fact reinforces a maxim that consumers
of forecasting services should respect generally anyway:
Do not simply assume that a prospective source of
judgment expertise (including oneself) is in fact expert,
on the basis of credentials, reputation, or anything else.
Instead, insist on empirical veriﬁcation of the sources
ability to provide forecasts that are reliably predictive of
the truth, e.g., using the kinds of accuracy measures
illustrated here.
Format
Another qualiﬁcation to the expectation of superior
accuracy on the part of professionals concerns how
forecasters are asked for their FX rate predictions. Al-
though the accuracy of professionals was generally
better than that of amateurs for point and probabilistic
directional forecasts, that superiority washed out for
interval forecasts. It is diﬃcult or impossible to directly
compare the accuracy of predictions reported in diﬀer-
ent formats. Nevertheless, the patterns in the present
data strongly suggest that formats can greatly aﬀect how
accurately forecasters make their predictions and,
therefore, the processes by which they arrive at those
predictions. One such pattern was the reversal in the
relative accuracy of one-day-ahead and one-week-ahead
point and interval forecasts, on the one hand, and
probabilistic directional forecasts, on the other. Another
was the marked diﬀerence in the accuracy of directional
predictions implicit in participants point forecasts and
those explicit in their probabilistic directional forecasts.
A stiﬀ challenge for future studies is determining exactly
why these format eﬀects occur. A plausible initial hy-
pothesis is that mere familiarity and experience with
formats play a role. In everyday practice, forecasters are
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predictions rather than probabilistic and interval ones.
A further, especially noteworthy ﬁnding can be
viewed in terms of formats, too, although in a diﬀerent
sense of the term. There were strong indications of
overconﬁdence in the case-level, in-the-moment predic-
tions participants reported in the directional and inter-
val formats. Yet, when the cumulative accuracy levels
that participants actually achieved were compared to the
levels they had originally said that they expected to
achieve, if any bias was evident, it was underconﬁdence
rather than overconﬁdence. That is, whether we should
expect overconﬁdence in FX forecasts (or perhaps any
other judgments) depends on when and how people are
asked to express their conﬁdence.
Explanation
The data in hand point toward at least some accounts
for the observed eﬀects. But it is clear that the most
diﬃcult challenges ahead concern explanations and their
implications for practical matters such as forecaster skill
development. One ﬁnding that begs for explanation is
the superiority of the present professional FX forecast-
ers over their amateur competitors when previous work
in the context of stock price and earnings predictions
yielded conﬂicting results (e.g., €Onkal & Muradoglu,
1994; Yates et al., 1991). The PS decomposition analyses
reported here suggests a proposal that should be sub-
jected to further, rigorous tests. Earlier research found
that experienced forecasters were less accurate than
novices in their probabilistic forecasts for stock prices
and earnings, at least for the particular forecasting for-
mats used in that research. This seemed to occur because
the experienced forecasters relied on information they
thought was associated with prices and earnings but
which really was not, thereby yielding greater noise.
Nothing like this was evident in the present FX data.
Instead, the professionals appeared to achieve greater
accuracy than the amateurs via superior discrimination,
calibration, and slope. Excellence with respect to these
accuracy dimensions rests on factors such as reliance on
cues that are truly predictive and on memory-supported
matching of probability reports and relative frequencies.
A reasonable hypothesis for the observed diﬀerences
between the forecasting of the stock prices and earnings,
on the one hand, and FX rates, on the other, is the
following: Prices and earnings for the myriad ﬁrms on
the market are aﬀected by a vast array of forces, many
of which may be speciﬁc to the individual ﬁrms and
inaccessible to outsiders, including forecasters. Never-
theless, it is tempting and easy for stock forecasters to
assemble plausible—but often diﬃcult-to-test—theories
for how to make good predictions. In contrast, FX
forecasters must concern themselves with a more limited
and manageable number of highly interdependent FXrates whose dynamics may be comparatively more
traceable and learnable. Additionally, there is reason to
suspect that the choice of forecast elicitation format is
an important determinant of the extent to which the
professionals actually display diﬀerent dimensions of
their forecasting expertise, regardless of the contextual
contingencies of their respective ﬁnancial markets
(€Onkal & Muradoglu, 1996; €Onkal-Atay, Thomson, &
Pollock, 2002).Appendix A. Instructions and form
Please note that the instructions and sample form
given below are for daily forecasts only. Instructions
and forms for the weekly forecasts were identical except
that 11 a.m. speciﬁcations were replaced with Monday
opening speciﬁcations.Instructions
In this part of our study, we request that you make
forecasts for the DAILY values of various FX rates. We
expect you to make forecasts for values that will be re-
alized at 11:00 a.m. tomorrow. For each of the rates in
question, we request that you state your forecasts using
three formats:
*POINT FORECASTS: Please write down the value
that you think will be realized at 11 a.m. tomorrow.
*INTERVAL FORECASTS: Please write down the
lowest and the highest value that this rate could take
on with 90% conﬁdence. In other words, you should be
90% conﬁdent that tomorrows 11 a.m. value will fall
between these two values (i.e., will fall within this
interval).
*DIRECTIONAL FORECASTS: First, please indi-
cate whether the value that will be realized at 11 a.m.
tomorrow will increase or not, compared to the value
observed today at 11 a.m. After predicting this direction
of change, please indicate the probability that your
forecast will indeed occur. This will be your subjective
probability that the realized change will actually fall in
the direction you predicted. Please note that, since you
will predict a direction for change ﬁrst, this probability
will have to be between 50 and 100%. If you specify
100% as your probability, this would mean that you are
absolutely certain (with no doubts whatsoever) that the
realized change will fall in the direction you predicted. If
you specify 50% as your probability, this would mean
that you believe theres an equal chance for the realized
change to fall in your predicted direction (indicating
your belief in an equal chance for an increase vs. stay
the same or decrease in the rate). Of course, you can
give any probability between 50 and 100%. Please keep
in mind that increasing percentages reﬂect stronger be-
liefs in predicted direction actually occurring.
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probability of less than 50%, since this would mean you
should of have indicated the other direction as your
predicted direction of change. For example, if you pre-
dicted an increase and then gave a 30% probability, this
would indicate that you believe there is a 70% chance of
no-increase (i.e., stay the same or decrease), in which
case you should of have indicated the stay the same or
decrease direction as your prediction, assigning a value
of 70% to it.Illustrative form
YEN/TL (DAILY FORECASTS)
*The value I think will be realized at 11 a.m. to-
morrow: ___________
*I am 90% conﬁdent that the value of this FX rate
that will be realized at 11 a.m. tomorrow will be between
___________ and ______________
*When compared to todays 11 a.m. value, tomor-
rows 11 a.m. value will:
A. Increase
B. Stay the same or decrease
Your forecast (A or B) : ___________
Probability that your forecast will indeed occur (i.e.,
probability that the daily change will actually fall in the
direction you predicted) (BETWEEN 50% AND 100%) :
___________Appendix B. Formulas for probability judgment accuracy
dimension indicators
Murphy decomposition
Calibration index. Suppose that all probabilistic
forecasts f for the target event (e.g., an FX rate in-
crease) are rounded to particular categories, e.g., the
nearest tenth, .0, 0, .1,. . .,1.0, which can be represented
as fk, for k ¼ 1; . . . ;K, where K is the total number of
categories. Then the calibration index (CI) is given by
(Murphy, 1973; Sanders, 1963):
CI ¼ ð1=NÞ
X
k
Nkðfk  dkÞ2: ðB:1Þ
In this expression, N ¼ N1 þ N2 þ    þ Nk is the total
number of forecasts, where Nk is the number of fore-
casts falling into the kth category, i.e., taking on value
fk. And dk;i is the outcome index for the judgment in
speciﬁc, individual case i, assuming the value 1 when the
target event occurs in that instance and 0 otherwise.
Thus, the mean of dk;i over all Nk cases when fk is re-
ported is dk and is also the proportion of times the target
actually occurred out of those cases. CI clearly measures
the extent to which the numerical value for a particular
forecast category matches the relative frequency withwhich the target event actually occurs when that forecast
is rendered.
Discrimination index. Using the same notation as
above, the expression for the discrimination index (DI)
is as follows (Murphy, 1973):
DI ¼ ð1=NÞ
X
k
Nkðdk  dÞ2: ðB:2Þ
Here, d is the mean of the outcome index over all N
cases, the overall base rate or proportion of times the
target event has occurred (e.g., the incidence of increases
for the FX rates under consideration). Note that fk plays
no role in DI . That is, DI is unaﬀected by the numerical
character of the reported forecasts. Instead, it reﬂects
the degree to which the forecaster tends to report dif-
ferent judgments on the occasions when the target event
occurs (dk;i ¼ 1) as opposed to those when it does not
(dk;i ¼ 0), regardless of the numbers attached to those
judgments. In eﬀect, DI is a measure of category asso-
ciation akin to the Pearson v2 statistic (Yaniv et al.,
1991).
Murphy decomposition. Murphy (1973) showed that
the following relation holds
PS ¼ dð1 dÞ þ CI  DI : ðB:3ÞCovariance decomposition
Bias. Suppose that f is the mean probability judg-
ment reported for the target event and d is, again, the
overall mean of the outcome index. Then the bias sta-
tistic is given by
Bias ¼ f  d: ðB:4Þ
Slope. Let f1 be the mean probability judgment re-
ported for the target event on those particular occasions
when it ultimately turns out that that event actually
occurs, and let f0 be the corresponding average for the
remaining instances when that event does not in fact
occur. The slope statistic for the forecasters judgments is
then represented as
Slope ¼ f1  f0: ðB:5Þ
Scatter. Suppose that Var(f1) is the variance of the
forecasters probabilistic forecasts for the target event
for the N1 cases in which the target event actually
happens and that Var(f0) is the corresponding statistic
for the remaining N0 instances when the target does not
occur. Then the scatter statistic (Scat) is given by
Scat ¼ ½N1 Varðf1Þ þ N0 Varðf0Þ=N ; ðB:6Þ
where N ¼ N1 þ N0 is the total number of cases. Scat is
an index of ‘‘noise’’ or ‘‘error,’’ variability in forecasts
that is independent of actual target event occurrences.
Minimum forecast variance. As a 1–0 indicator vari-
able, the variance of the outcome index d is
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Yates (1982) showed that the following is the minimum
variance in forecasts f that is possible given a particular
base rate d and value of Slope
MinVarðf Þ ¼ Slope2VarðdÞ: ðB:8Þ
Covariance decomposition. Yates (1982; see also Yates
& Curley, 1985) showed the following:
PS ¼ VarðdÞ þMinVarðf Þ þ Scat þ Bias2
 2½Slope½VarðdÞ: ðB:9ÞReceived 29 October 2001References
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